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Symbolic Interaction and an Interpretive Approach to 
Cross-Cultural Psychiatry 
Henry Dyson V 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga 
Adoption of the medical model of psychopathology has de-emphasized the need for psychiatry to 
incorporate new developments from the other social sciences. The need for an interpretive (rather than 
merely biological) approach to psychopathology based upon theories of symbolic interaction is argued in 
the present article with respect to the emerging field of cross-cultural psychiatry. Groundwork for such an 
approach is sketched out by application of Obeyesekere's (1981) anthropological theory of personal 
symbols. 
Recent research into the connections between 
neurochemical processes and psychopathology have led 
to an expanded view of the brain's role in human 
behavior and the development of pharmocological 
treatment for mental disorder. Unfortunately, this 
narrowed area of focus has led to a corresponding lack 
of attention to developments in the social sciences, 
namely new theories concerning the symbolic aspects 
of human behavior. Such a lack of interest is 
understandable given the basic premises on which the 
medical model of psychopathology predicates itself. 
The root core of the medical model is its view that 
psychopathology stems from structural or 
neurochemical impairments of the brain which inhibit 
the diseased individual from meeting certain societal 
standards of behavior. Yet, as the vast literature on the 
medicalization of deviance has pointed out, this view 
tends to localize the often systemic problem of deviant 
behavior within disempowered individuals (see Conrad, 
1980; Szasz, 1961). Moreover, though the etiology of 
the disorder is assumed to be physical, the diagnosis of 
a disorder is made on the basis of behavioral 
observations and symbolic interaction through 
language, both of which are culturally mediated. Thus, 
the problem of making a diagnosis is compounded 
when the diagnostician and therapist are from different 
cultural backgrounds. 
An empirical example will make this point clear. 
Eisenbruch (1992) has argued that the DSM-Ill 
diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is 
not applicable in his work with Cambodian refugees. 
He claims:  
The diagnosis is often based upon an ethnocentric 
view of health that prescribes how refugees should 
express their distress, how disorders should be 
classified, and how the distress should be ameliorated. 
It offers a checklist of criteria, many of which are 
physical changes in the person's body that are easy to 
elicit and presumed to occur as a universal 
physiological reaction to stress, without regard to the 
nature of the stressor or the individual's cultural 
background. (p. 8) 
Pointing to case studies and statistics on non-
compliance with pharmacological treatments as 
evidence of his point, he argues such diagnoses are 
seldom helpful in treating individuals of different 
cultural backgrounds. Rather, focusing on these 
presumed universals obscures the contextual reasons for 
the behavior. Eisenbruch substituted the term "cultural 
bereavement" as a more accurate diagnosis for 
Cambodian refugees normally diagnosed with PTSD. In 
his formulation the individual's behavior results when 
his/her link with the past and cultural categories of 
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meaning has been violently torn away, leaving the 
individual with no way in which to assimilate his/her 
present condition with previous experience. This state 
causes behavioral aberrations and somatic symptoms. 
The Western diagnosis of PTSD and its ensuing 
treatment, usually antidepressants or clonidine (Kinzie 
& Leung, 1989), may actually harm the refugee by 
further disassociating him/her from the native culture. 
Eisenbruch points to the efficacy of traditional healers 
and ritualistic treatments in reconnecting the individual 
with his/her painful past and thus allowing continuity 
of meaning and restored functioning in his/her 
transplanted community. 
Eisenbruch's (1992) article makes plain the need 
for an interpretive approach to psychopathology which 
assigns to culture a more comprehensive role than the 
ephemeral position it holds in the current medical 
paradigm. Such an approach must begin with an 
examination into the role of culture in the symbolic 
interaction between the individual and his/her culture. It 
must then go to demonstrate the effect which the 
symbolic idiom of a culture has upon the expression 
and perception of psychopathology. Finally, an 
interpretive approach should be applied not only to the 
premises of cross-cultural psychiatry, but reflexively 
applied to the expression and perception of 
psychopathology in the Western world, including the 
medical paradigm. 
Personal Symbols and Myth Models of 
Behavior 
Gananath Obeyesekere's (1981) Medusa's Hair: An 
Essay of Personal Symbols and Religious Experience, 
an ethnographic study of ecstatic priestesses in Sri 
Lanka, provides a theoretical approach to symbolic 
interaction which can be used as the basis for an 
interpretive approach to psychopathology. In its 
theoretical orientation, the book is an attempt to bring 
personality back into the scope of anthropological 
studies by undermining the traditional dichotomy of 
private and cultural symbols. To accomplish this goal 
Obeyesekere uses Freud's psychoanalytic concepts to 
model the explanatory model for reconnecting the 
symbolism of the ecstatics with their interpersonal 
situations. The psychoanalytic perspective is then 
grafted upon a Weberian theory of culture to describe a 
set of cognitive concepts which the individual uses to 
assimilate and give meaning to the whole of 
experience. He thus constructs a view of symbolic 
interaction by which the individual and his/her culture 
are brought together in a dialectic. 
Obeyesekere's theoretical discussions are cast upon 
the background of his field work with ecstatic  
priestesses • at the Sinhala Buddhist festival of 
Kataragama in Sri Lanka. He describes in great detail 
the symbolic contents of the ecstatics' various visions 
and somatizations. Specifically, he is interested in the 
matted locks of hair empirically associated with 
abstinence among the ecstatics. Drawing from Leach's 
(1958) interpretation of matted locks in his essay 
"Magical Hair," Obeyesekere notes the traditional 
methodological separation of private and cultural 
symbols. Private symbols, traditionally the domain of 
psychoanalysis, are attributed to intrapsychic conflict 
(deep motivation) which may give rise to somatic 
manifestations or delusions. These delusions, though 
they will certainly take their content from the 
surrounding culture, are themselves devoid of cultural 
meaning. Cultural symbols, on the other hand, are 
viewed by most anthropologists as integral to group 
communication and identification, yet are denied any 
personal significance or deep motivation stemming 
from the individual qua individual. Rather, 
anthropologists have generally focused upon group 
motivations and collective practices in their etiologies 
of symbolic systems. Obeyesekere uses the problem of 
matted hair to point out the danger of transporting 
methodological assumptions across cultural boundaries. 
The dichotomy of private/cultural symbols, he 
demonstrates, is a product of Western intellectualism 
and is not empirically supported in Sinhala culture. 
Leach (1958), arguing against Berg's (1951) 
psychoanalytic interpretation of matted locks for Hindi 
holy men (the Sanyasin), draws evidence from the 
Vedas that hair and sexuality are explicitly linked in the 
culture and thus in the conscious minds of the ascetics. 
To Leach the symbolic nature of matted hair is not 
private but public, announcing to society that this 
person has willingly renounced sex. Obeyesekere retorts 
that both Berg's and Leach's analyses ignore the context 
in which the symbol arises and persists. He 
demonstrates his own theory of symbolic representation 
through a comparison of matted locks for the Sanyasin 
and shaved heads for Buddhist monks. He states that 
• true symbols are always public in that their essential 
nature is communication. By this, however, he does 
not imply that symbols cannot be the manifestations of 
deep motivation, but simply that manifestations which 
do not reach the level of public recognition (and 
sanction) do not belong to the category of symbols but 
to symptoms and fantasies in the nature demonstrated 
by Western psychotics. Thus symbols can never be 
private—but they may be personal. By personal 
symbols Obeyesekere understands a symbolic 
representation which is drawn from the realm of public 
mythology and animated by the deep motivation of the 
individual. This definition has a profound effect upon 
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the expression of psychopathology. For example, a 
member of Buddhist culture who suffers from a 
castration complex need not find recourse in typical 
(Western) neurotic behavior because there is an 
acceptable outlet for such anxiety within the culture 
itself—Buddhist head-shaving. Anthropologists such as 
Leach have ignored the personal context in which 
symbols arise by denying that acts such as head-
shaving can manifest deep motivation because they are 
cultural, an ignorance imposed by an ethnocentric bias 
in methodology. 
By stating that cultural symbols may be animated 
by deep motivation, Obeyesekere does not by any 
means align himself with the psychoanalytic 
interpretation of symbols. Traditional psychoanalysis is 
equally guilty for ignoring the socio-cultural context in 
which symbols must persist if they are to be true 
symbols rather than symptoms. Again there is a bias in 
the methodology which here insists that every 
manifestation of a symbol is derived from deep 
motivation, that is, that every Buddhist monk that 
shaves his head does so because of castration anxiety. 
Obeyesekere provides a distinction between symbols 
which are personal and those which are merely 
psychogenetic. Psychogenetic symbols represent the 
largest class of symbols which are in any way derived 
from the unconscious, but which need not be derived 
from the deep motivation of the particular individual 
who participates in them. One must look at the context 
in which participation occurs. For example, head-
shaving has become institutionalized with Buddhist 
monkhood and is required for every monk. Yet the 
motivation for monkhood may not always rest in 
castration anxiety but in purely external circumstances, 
as Obeyesekere demonstrates empirically through an 
examination of recruitment practices. In such a case the 
symbol exists on a level which is purely interpersonal, 
articulating membership in the group—although its 
original meaning may have once been symbolic 
castration. 
In order for a psychogenetic symbol to be personal 
it must be recreated by the deep motivation of the 
individual. In searching for personal symbols 
anthropologists must always be attuned to cultural 
ambiguity allowing individual choice to play a part in 
manifestation. Head-shaving is an institutionalized 
ritual for all monks, yet matted locks are not such a 
requirement for the Sanyasin. This allows Obeyesekere 
to claim that matted locks are primarily personal 
symbols whereas shaved heads are primarily 
psychogenetic (though they may be personal as well). 
He gives the name objectification to the process by 
which the deep motivation of the individual is recreated 
within cultural, psychogenetic symbols. Obeyesekere  
extends this line of thinking in his case histories of 
ecstatics who are believed to be possessed by pretas, the 
spirits of ancestors who act as mediators between 
humans and the gods. The lack of formalization 
associated with preta mythology allows this symbolic 
idiom to be manipulated by the individual ecstatic. 
Particularly, Obeyesekere emphasizes the role of 
choice: choice of which dead ancestor the preta 
represents and even for which god or goddess in the 
pantheon the preta speaks. Objectification allows the 
psychopathology of the sufferer to be expressed in a 
way which is understandable and accepted by the 
community. 
Obeyesekere demonstrates that personal symbols 
are a connection between the individual and society. In 
his case histories he provides the interpersonal and 
intrapsychic relations which he believes led to the 
"psychotic" behavior of his informants. In this analysis 
he uses Freud's concepts to Desiree the effect of the 
interpersonal context upon the psyche of the individual. 
However, there is one major point in which the 
ecstatics differ from Freud's neurotics—the existence of 
a symbolic idiom intelligible to both the individual and 
society. The ecstatics not only manifest their deep 
motivation in terms of visions expressed in symbolic 
idiom, but are themselves acting out a symbolic mode 
of behavior which conforms to certain cultural-mythical 
roles. Obeyesekere calls these models of behavior 
"myth models." The myth model is cultural and not 
private in that it exists outside the individual as a mode 
of discourse between the unconscious needs of the 
individual and his/her social context. For example, in 
one of the case studies a young female ecstatic is 
possessed by the Black Prince (Kalu Kumara). The fact 
that the adolescent is possessed by this particular 
demon, Obeyesekere states, makes plain to all in the 
community the sexual nature of her ailment and allows 
the proper recourse (a quick marriage). The girls' 
visions make meaningful a set of psychic phenomena 
in the same way that cultural idiom is evoked to 
provide meaning for physical phenomena, such as 
natural' disasters. The myth model of the ecstatic 
priestess allows the psychic turmoil of the individual to 
be expressed in a way which, unlike the experience of 
Freud's neurotics, reconnects the suffering individual to 
society. 
Subjective Imagery and the Etiology of 
Symbolic Idiom 
Obeyesekere's second theoretical project in the 
book is to provide an etiological explanation for 
psychogenetic symbols in cultural idioms. The above 
discussion of objectification makes it apparent that 
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Obeyesekere has already broken ranks with Durkheim's 
(1915/1954) superorganic view in which culture acts 
upon the passive individual in a manner which creates 
normative behavior and modal personalities. Rather, the 
symbolic idiom of culture provides the individual with 
the cognitive tools to render natural and psychic 
phenomena meaningful. 
In this formulation the consciousness of the 
individual is in constant dialogue with his/her culture, a 
process which Obeyesekere demonstrates through the 
creation of subjective imagery. Whereas objectification 
represented the articulation of psychopathology in 
terms of pre-existent forms, subjective imagery 
involves the incorporation of ambiguous cultural 
material into the creation of a subjective idiom (not 
existent at the level of general culture) which is 
nonetheless acceptable and articulate to the society. 
This is possible because cultural forms are 
underdetermined with respect to their-psychic origins, a 
notion which Obeyesekere borrows from Weber's 
definition of culture as "the finite segment of the 
meaningless infinity of world-process, a segment on 
which human beings confer meaning and significance" 
(1946, p. 81). 
Two points about the nature of culture as a 
symbolic system are brought out in this definition. 
First, Weber is clear in his designation of individual 
consciousness as an active agent in the creation of 
cultural meaning systems rather than a passive 
recipient. Second, Weber indicates that since culture is 
a finite segment within an infinite series it will always 
involve an element of choice. Obeyesekere's 
formulation of subjective imagery captures this notion 
of culture and roughly corresponds to Weber's 
discussions of charisma as the individual's ability to 
affect culture (pp. 245-252). Cultural symbol systems 
exist as a pathway to interpersonal and societal 
discourse; yet culture, far from providing norms for 
modal personalities, provides a means for accounting 
for nonregular occurrences. If meaning for intrapsychic 
stress cannot be found within the existent myth 
models, the individual is empowered as a symbol 
creator with the ability to recreate the cultural idiom to 
articulate his/her own psychic needs. 
If it is true that the creative power of subjective 
imagery stems from the deep motivation of the 
individual, it does not follow that he/she is free to 
define symbolic meaning outside the realm of culture. 
Indeed, given the Weberian perspective it would be 
impossible to do so: the individual will always draw 
upon cultural concepts in the creation of subjective 
meaning. Subjective imagery is dependent upon socio-
cultural conditions for historical verification and 
ultimate acceptance if it is to be symbolic and not  
symptomak. In his discussion of savior myths, Weber 
(1946, pp. 358-9) demonstrates that the emergence of 
charismatic leaders in the role of messianic figures is 
dependent upon a "theodicy of suffering" caused by 
recurrent psychological need. While this theodicy does 
not represent a cultural form in the mode of a myth 
model to which the charismatic leader must fit, it does 
condition a certain degree of receptivity towards some 
forms over others. The essential difference between a 
prophet and a psychotic is the degree to which the 
culture embraces and incorporates the charismatic 
figure. Weber (pp. 248-50) states that all charisma 
must either become institutional or else die away. Thus 
the etiology of culture proceeds by dialectic: if the 
subjective imagery of the individual is embraced by 
society it will become subsumed within the greater 
symbolic idiom. 
Obeyesekere demonstrates Weber's theory 
empirically in his case histories and account of the 
original ecstatics in the Sinhala festival at Kataragama. 
He reports that when the ecstatic priestesses first began 
to make their appearance at the Kataragama festival, 
they claimed that they were possessed by the gods. 
Prior to this no culturally sanctioned myth model for 
such behavior existed, and the priests in charge of the 
festival refused to accept that the gods would inhabit 
the impure body of a woman. The ecstatics were forced 
to accept a compromised interpretation that their 
visions were actually the effect of preta possession but 
that the pretas acted as merely intermediaries for the 
gods. This compromise, which over time has become 
culturally and institutionally accepted, does not 
represent a 'pigeonholing' of subjective experience 
within a pre-existent myth model. Rather, the ecstatics 
were able to gain cultural acceptance by transforming 
the myth model of preta possession to legitimize the 
claim that they spoke the words of the gods. 
Institutionalization and the De-
mythologizing of Symbolic Idiom 
Note that to this point the discussion has focused 
on the attributes of symbolic systems and the 
interaction between culture and the individual visions of 
the ecstatics. Little attention has been paid to the 
ecstatics themselves. Obeyesekere, due to his Freudian 
perspective, considers the visions of the ecstatics to be 
pathological in that they are the manifestations of 
intrapsychic turmoil. As Johannes (1984) points out in 
her review of the book, the author's discussion of case 
studies leaves the reader with the impression that 
dissociative states are inherently pathological. Yet this 
in itself is not sufficient for labeling these women 
mentally "ill" in the sense implied by Western 
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nosologies. As many in the literature have pointed out 
(Szasz, 1961; Foucault, 1974; see also Fabrega, 1976; 
Sedgwick, 1982; Wakefield, 1992), mental "illness" is 
a cultural classification with a specific history in 
Western medicine that carries with it a number of 
assumptions that are difficult to apply cross-culturally. 
The designation of mental "illness" can best be 
described in terms of symbolic systems. This 
perspective introduces the concept of cultural relativism 
into the universalistic medical paradigm. Even if it is 
assumed, for the moment, that the Sinhala ecstatic and 
the Western psychotic are equally pathological, it is 
still the case that the course of their pathology will be 
very different. The pathology of the ecstatic is 
expressed in a symbolic idiom which allows discourse 
of personal needs with the society and facilitates the 
reintegration of the individual into the community. The 
label of mental "illness," on the other hand, continually 
marginalizes rather than reintegrates the - Western 
psychotic. In Obeyesekere's scheme this consequence 
lies not in the pathology of the individual but in the 
inability of a demythologized symbolic code to 
integrate the subjective imagery of the individual. 
Rather than transforming the cultural idiom, the 
Western psychotic is forcefully pigeonholed into ever 
more comprehensive "myth models" of Western 
psychiatric taxonomies. While these "myth models" do 
allow society to attribute some degree of 
comprehensibility to the psychotic's actions, they do 
not meet the needs of the psychotics themselves, 
whether intrapsychic or interpersonal. To follow 
Obeyesekere's line of thinking, the Western secular 
world has so demythologized its symbolic code that it 
is no longer capable of manifesting the deep motivation 
of individuals. Denied access to cultural myth models 
and verification of their own subjective imagery, the 
afflicted individual is forced to act out the 
manifestations of their turmoil in private symptom-
symbols. 
Obeyesekere does not himself reconstruct the 
process by which Western symbolic idiom has reached 
this demythologized point, but his discussion of 
personal symbols and subjective imagery give several 
hints to the process which are relevant to an 
interpretive approach to psychopathology. The 
instrument by which institutionalization takes place is 
the introduction of rational discipline designed to 
impose predictability on charisma's incalculable nature 
(Weber, 1946). The definitive effect is the reduction of 
choice available to the deep motivation of the 
individual. Thus preta possession, once the subjective 
image of a few pioneering ecstatics, becomes a myth 
model with certain rules to which aspirants must 
comply. One of these rules includes the psychic  
disposition to go into trance states. Obeyesekere 
describes the pathetic plight of one young woman who 
lacked this basic qualification and was forced to act out 
her distress in less culturally recognized ways. As 
mythologies become more and more rigid and 
standardized in their formulation, there is less and less 
choice allowed in the personal recreation of the symbol. 
What was once a primarily personal symbol becomes 
primarily psychogenetic, as in the case of Buddhist 
head-shaving. This progression can be seen in Western 
history in the creation of the scientific method through 
the continual rationalization of folk and mythological 
explanations of natural phenomena. In Obeyesekere's 
account of Kataragama, institutionalization occurs more 
in the realm of artistic and mythic representation than 
in the strict sense of Western rationalization, but the 
effect is the same: as they are subjected to conscious 
scrutinization, symbols lose their ambiguity and thus 
their ability to articulate to society the deep 
motivational needs of the individual. 
Conclusions 
Cultural symbolic systems, as both Weber (1946) 
and Obeyesekere point out, serve as explanatory 
categories rendering acts of nature meaningful even 
when the psychogenetic symbols themselves have 
ceased to carry deep motivation. This is essentially the 
state of Western secular thought. Scientific categories 
have become extremely demythologized with the 
introduction of rational methodology, yet they remain 
symbolic systems nonetheless. This fact is often 
obscured by a logical flaw by which the explanatory 
structures of scientific theory are placed in an 
antecedent, causal position (Dewey, 1925). In Dewey's 
formulation of scientific empiricism, explanatory 
structures are abstracted from experience in order to 
provide a greater level of understanding and control over 
nature. However, it is a logical fallacy to then place 
these structures in a position metaphysically anterior to 
experience. Both psychoanalysis and the biomedical 
model .of psychiatry display this fallacy when they 
assume that psychological phenomena are generated by 
underlying forms which are applicable cross-culturally. 
In this medical model an individual's culture merely 
provides the surface content of psychopathology. It is 
assumed that pathological states are causally determined 
in the same way that physical events are determined. 
However, an appeal to mechanistic views of human 
behavior, whether biological or psychoanalytic, tends 
to obscure the contextual factors influencing behavior 
and de-emphasize the role of human agency (Szasz, 
1961). In a recent paper on spirit possession in South 
Asia, Castillo (1994) concludes that biomedical 
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psychiatry and psychoanalysis are both inadequate for 
understanding the phenomenology of trance states 
because the experiential level at which we encounter 
these states is caught up in culturally constituted 
categories of thought. What is needed to understand 
such diverse cultural phenomena is a theoretical 
framework which restores integrity to indigenous 
modes of explanation consistent with the cognitive 
categories of the individual. 
Obeyesekere's formulation of symbolic systems, 
despite its use of psychoanalytic modes of explanation, 
provides the theoretical support for an interpretive view 
of psychopathology and a valuable heuristic model for 
combating the inherent universalism of Western 
science. His case studies are a vivid reminder that, 
regardless of their etiological histories, the behavioral 
disturbances by which mental "illnesses" are identified 
are culturally mediated. Moreover, his interpretation of 
Weber secures the position of the- individual as an 
active agent in cultural theory. The tendency of recent 
psychiatric taxonomies such as the DSM-IV to portray 
pathological categories as discreet entities existing in 
culture-free nature is a prime example of Dewey's 
positivist fallacy and a dangerous trend to cross-cultural 
psychiatry (Eisenbruch, 1992; Littlewood 1991; see 
also Fabrega, 1976, 1987, 1994; Kirmayer, 1991). As 
long as it is assumed that by stripping away the 
cultural "clothing" of pathological behavior the 
diagnostician can arrive at the etiological core of the 
disease, cross-cultural psychiatry will betray its 
ethnocentrism as an attempt to impose Western, 
demythologized categories of thought upon indigenous 
behaviors. For this reason it is necessary that 
psychiatry move beyond its positivist bias toward the 
development of a more comprehensive theory of 
psychopathology based upon a general theory of 
behavior which includes both culture and symbolic 
behavior. 
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